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Introduction
 
 
 
 
The subject of this thesis is the Normans. Its objective is to analyse the development 
of their civilisation, and to give reasons for their numerous accomplishments, both in 
Northern Europe and in the Mediterranean. Yet, unlike the many scholars who have 
studied the Normans before, the main focus here will be on rebellion, and in particular 
those rebellions which followed the succession of each Norman ruler (either a king or 
a duke/count), as it will be argued that when dealt with correctly these revolts did not 
hinder, but instead created the seeds of power and progress; since they gave the new 
ruler an opportunity to establish a lasting precedent early on, that insolence to their 
authority would not be tolerated; which if accomplished, then led to harmony (internal 
peace), development and conquest for the rest of the ruler’s reign. Indeed, to illustrate 
this premise further it was once written by the twelfth-century chronicler, Orderic 
Vitalis: that ‘if the Normans are disciplined under a just and firm rule they are men of 
great valour, who press on invincibly to the fore in arduous undertaking… Without 
such rule they tear each other to pieces and destroy themselves.’1 Clearly, he is 
emphasising here the importance of strong leadership (which, as this thesis will argue, 
can only truly be obtained via the crushing of rebellion) and in turn, the consequences 
of weakness.  This is particularly important, since it will also be argued here that 
when a ruler fails to crush rebellious elements early, the reign afterwards is generally 
chaotic, due to the fact that they did not set a lasting precedent of strength. 
 
Furthermore, in addition to this central theme, each chapter will also examine the role 
that rebellion played in helping to facilitate a number of major historic events; such as 
the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, Henry I’s conquest of Normandy in 1106, 
                                                 
1
 M. Chibnall (trans.), The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, 6 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1969 – 80), Vol. IV, pp.82-3 
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 5 
the conquest of Southern Italy by Robert Guiscard and also how it helped to increase 
the power and prestige of the kingdom of Southern Italy and Sicily.
2
 Yet, before going 
into more detail – as chapter structure will be discussed later – it is necessary to give a 
brief history of the Normans in question and to identify some of the reasons which 
historians have attributed for their many achievements, so as to ascertain how they fit 
in with the context of this thesis. 
 
First their history: originating from Scandinavia, the first Normans settled in Northern 
France after the Viking Rollo was ceded territory around the lower Seine (including 
Rouen) by the Carolingian king, Charles the Simple in 911.
3
 Extra land was then 
acquired through both additional grants (in 924 and in 933) and conquest, giving the 
Normans, by 933, a precarious hold over almost all the territories that made up future 
Normandy.
4
 Indeed, as Orderic Vitalis later recorded (writing in the 1130s): their 
‘bold roughness’ had proved ‘deadly to their softer neighbours’.5 
 
Over the next century however, the Normans swiftly began to acquire the civilisation 
of Franks, adopting mounted warfare, Christianity and the French dialect – the langue 
d'oïl.
6
 In particular, the reign of Richard II (996 –1026) was one of great reform.7 For 
instance in 1001, he tasked Italian abbot, William of Volpiano to expand the Church 
throughout the duchy and by 1066 the number of monasteries had increased from five 
at the turn of the millennium to over thirty.
8
 In Addition to this, Normandy also 
became famous for its Romanesque architecture and its schools; as during the time of 
Duke William II (1035 – 87) the Abbey of Bec was controlled by two of the greatest 
intellects of the age, Lanfranc (1044 – 66) and Anselm (1066 – 93).9 All this placed 
the Normans within the front rank of European civilisations by the second half of the 
                                                 
2
 R. H. C. Davis, The Normans and their Myth (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 1976), pp.71-103 
3
 D. C. Douglas, ‘Rollo of Normandy’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 57, No.228 (October, 
1942), p.427 
4
 T. Rowley, The Normans (London: Tempus, 2004), p.31 
5
 Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. V, pp. 24-7 
6
 M. Chibnall, The Normans (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp.14-25 
7
 Rowley, ‘The Normans’, p.45 
8
 Ibid., p.46 
9
 Davis, ‘The Normans and their Myth’, p.8 
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 6 
eleventh-century. And yet, in spite of this, in warfare they were still unsurpassed; with 
their most famous triumph occurring at the Battle of Hastings in 1066. It was a victory 
suggested R. Allen Brown, owed to ‘superior military techniques’ and to ‘William’s 
superior generalship’; a superiority which the Bayeux Tapestry pays tribute to.10 
 
Still, at much the same time, knights from Normandy also began to acquire territory in 
Southern Italy and Sicily. On the mainland this was first achieved by grants (Aversa 
in 1030), and later by the conquest of former Byzantine lands – and also the Lombard 
provinces of Capua, Salerno and Benevento – the majority of which, were seized by 
the ‘practiced cunning’11 of Robert Guiscard, who in 1059 was invested as Duke of 
Apulia and Calabria by Pope Nicholas II.
12
 Much of the conquest ended with the fall 
of Salerno, the last Lombard stronghold, in 1076 (also see chapter three for further 
details).
13
 As for Sicily however, the island’s capture (1061 – 91) was largely 
completed by Robert’s younger brother Roger; and ultimately it was through him (and 
Sicily) that the foundations were laid for the future kingdom.
14
 For a century after the 
Normans’ first initial grant, Roger’s son, Roger II (1105 – 54) was crowned ‘King of 
Sicily’ and ruler over all of Southern Italy, in 1130, by Pope Anacletus II; giving the 
Normans their second kingdom.
15
 
 
In both England and Sicily, Norman rulers gave out conquered territory to their 
supporters in the form of fiefs – that is land held in return for the payment of knight-
service – thus creating a centralised feudal system.16 In addition, the Normans also (in 
both kingdoms) retained the pre-existing and highly evolved government institutions 
of finance and administration; whilst naturally making considerable improvements.
 
                                                 
10
 R. A. Brown, ‘The Battle of Hastings ’, cited in J. Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, in M. 
Strickland (eds.), Anglo-Norman Warfare (New York: The Boydell Press, 1993), p.143 
11
 R. A. B. Mynors, R. M. Thomson & M. Winterbottom (trans.), William of Malmesbury: Gesta 
Regum Anglorum (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), p.483 
12
 C. Gravett & D. Nicolle, The Normans: Warrior Knights and their Castles (Oxford: Osprey Ltd, 
2006), p.48 
13
 Davis, ‘The Normans and their Myth’, p.79 
14
 B. H. Rosenwein, A Short History of the Middle Ages (Plymouth: Broadview Press, 2005), p.220 
15
 Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. VI, p.435 
16
 C. H. Haskins, ‘England and Sicily in the Twelfth Century’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 26, 
No.103 (July, 1911), p.433 
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For example in England, King Henry I (1100 – 35) introduced the exchequer, and also 
strengthened the country’s ‘legal and fiscal framework’;17 whilst in Sicily, Roger II 
implemented a new type of coinage, which included the ducat in 1140.
18
 And yet, in 
spite of these similarities, the two kingdoms were in fact remarkably different; for 
unlike in England, the Normans of Italy and Sicily created a civilisation that, with its 
strange mixture of Latin, Greek and Arabic, produced some of the most unique multi-
cultural cities, artwork and architecture in twelfth-century Europe.
19
 Indeed, according 
to Arab Geographer al-Edrisi (1150s), Palermo was ‘the greatest and finest metropolis 
in the world’.20 To sum up: it is clear that the Normans were great statesmen, as well 
as great conquerors. In fact, they were once described by F. M. Stenton (1943) as ‘the 
masters of their world’.21 But why were the Normans so successful? 
 
To the eleventh- and twelfth-century chroniclers the theme of warfare was particularly 
dominant, with Norman success often attributed to valour, strong leadership and to the 
discipline of their mounted knights.
22
 Indeed, the image created by the chroniclers 
suggested that the Normans had ‘unique military skills’; a premise later discredited by 
R. H. C. Davis, in The Normans and their Myth (1976).
23
 Yet, as well as admiration 
for their military prowess, the chroniclers also highlighted the Normans’ brutality. For 
instance, Roger II was deemed particularly ruthless in 1133 when subduing rebellion 
in Apulia; as Alexander of Telese wrote (c.1140): ‘he promulgated such mighty and 
thorough justice that continuous peace was soon to endure’.24 In fact, the use of harsh 
measures, often to enforce the law, was widely acknowledged as valid by the sources; 
since they recognised the necessity for a prince to display his authority by punishing 
those who rebelled sternly; a point which will be examined in further detail during the 
                                                 
17
 Rowley, ‘The Normans’, p.92 
18
 D. Matthew, The Norman Kingdom of Sicily (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.241 
19
 R. Stalley, Early Medieval Architecture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.221 
20
 Rowley, ‘The Normans’, p.199 
21
 F. M. Stenton, Anglo-Norman England (London: Clarendon Press, 1943), p.678 
22
 Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. IV, p.17 – Orderic is not the only 
chronicler who comments on the Normans’ military skill; others, such as, William of Malmesbury, 
William of Jumièges and William of Poitiers all made a similar observation. 
23
 Davis, ‘The Normans and their Myth’, pp.62-68 
24
 G. A. Loud (trans.), Alexander of Telese: The Deeds Done by King Roger of Sicily [Online]. 
Available: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/20041/school_of_history, p.16 
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 8 
following chapters.
25
 However, it is worth mentioning, here, that there were limits, 
since not all acts of punishment were viewed as justified. For example, Orderic Vitalis 
considered King William’s ‘harrying of the North’ (1069 – 70), as ‘barbarous 
homicide’.26 He stated: ‘for this act which condemned the innocent and guilty alike to 
die by slow starvation I cannot commend him.’27 Although, Orderic still regarded 
William’s kingship as legitimate based on hereditary right, which he claimed through 
the marriage, in 1002, of Duke Richard II’s sister, Emma to King Æthelred II the 
Unready.
28
 Legitimacy was viewed by the chroniclers as a crucial factor behind the 
Normans’ success. 
 
In more recent times however, many historians have been inclined to focus on the 
Norman impact and how they transformed the societies that they conquered. One area 
in particular concerns the prickly debate over ‘the introduction of knight-service’; a 
system which, as recognised by J. H. Round (1891), owed its origins in England to 
King William I.
29
 Round also argued that this system was completely new, since the 
knights William demanded from each tenant bore no definite relation to the extent or 
value of their lands; and as such, ‘was in no way derived or developed’ during the 
Anglo-Saxon period.
30
 His conclusion was acquired by working backwards towards 
Domesday Book from the 1166 Inquest into service quotas recorded in the Red Book 
and Black Book of the Exchequer.
31
 A similar method was also used by the American 
historian C. H. Haskins, who studied the service returns (1172) from the ecclesiastical 
tenants of King Henry II, to establish that the Normans had been familiar with knight-
service from the time of Duke Robert I (1027 – 35).32 However, the idea that English 
feudalism was derived solely from its Normandy counterpart has been criticised more 
                                                 
25
 Mynors et al, ‘William of Malmesbury’, pp.425-41 
26
 D. C. Douglas, William the Conqueror: The Norman Impact upon England (London: Eyre Methuen, 
1964), p.221 
27
 Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. II, pp.232-33 
28
 Ibid., Vol. VI, pp.168-69 
29
 J. H. Round, ‘The Introduction of Knight Service into England’, The England Historical Review, 
Vol. 6, No. 23 (July, 1891), pp.440-43 
30
 Ibid., p.442 
31
 M. Chibnall, The Debate on the Norman Conquest (Manchester: University Press, 1999), p. 62 
32
 C. H. Haskins, ‘Knight-Service in Normandy in the Eleventh Century’, The English Historical 
Review, Vol. 22, No. 88 (October, 1907), pp.637-40 
University of Chester: 0508605  D13285 
 9 
recently; since it is argued that the Anglo-Saxon payment of ‘five hides for military 
service’ was used after 1066.33 Indeed, as D. C. Douglas suggested (1964): though the 
Normans gave the elements of feudalism to England, it was the Conquest itself which 
completed the organisation of feudal society on both sides of the Channel.
34
 Despite 
disagreements, what is perhaps most significant, with regards to my work, is that there 
has yet to be a study which links rebellion to the introduction of English feudalism; 
thus, one of the aims of this thesis is to argue (in chapter two) that its implementation 
occurred after the suppression of a major revolt – when royal authority was strong. A 
strong feudal system was also a factor behind the Normans’ success in warfare. 
  
To continue with the subject of feudal order, there has also been much said in relation 
to its origin. Indeed, as suggested by Georges Duby (1953): its creation occurred in 
France, at around the year 1000, when as a result of increasing de-centralisation, the 
institutions of ‘public order’ gave way to a new feudal system, in which aristocratic 
lords wielded power over smaller territories through the use of strong-arm tactics and 
threats of violence.
35
 In addition, this change also led to the rapid multiplication of 
new lordships, knights and castles; and was thus, a product – as Duby argued – of ‘a 
social revolution’ that took place in Europe from about 990 to 1060.36 However, the 
introduction of new lordships did create problems for established rulers – such as the 
dukes of Normandy – since their power had to be restrained both by force and by acts, 
such as the Truce of God (proclaimed by the Church to curb unlicensed warfare).
37
 Of 
course, with control came powerful alliances, but to permit troublesome vassals to 
remain unrestrained often proved disastrous. For example, by failing to deal with his 
rebellious barons – such as the ‘treacherous count, Robert of Bellême’38 – Robert II 
lost Normandy to his brother Henry, at the Battle of Tinchebrai (1106), as a result of 
                                                 
33
 Chibnall, ‘The Debate on the Norman Conquest’, p.62 
34
 Douglas, ‘William the Conqueror’, p.146  
35
 G. Duby, La sociètè aux XIe et XIIe siècles dans la region mâconnaise (Paris, 1953), cited in T. N. 
Bisson, ‘The “Feudal Revolution”’, Past & Present, No. 142 (February, 1994), pp.6-9 
36
 Bisson, ‘The “Feudal Revolution”’, pp.7-8 
37
 D. Crouch, The Normans: The History of a Dynasty (London: Hambledon & London, 2002), p.66 
38
 D. Greenway (trans.), Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon: Historia Anglorum (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996), p.451 
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his weak position (see chapter two).
39
 The consequences of failing to crush rebellious 
lords is a further area that this thesis will explore. 
 
And finally, before moving to look at chapter structure, it seems necessary to examine 
briefly the nature of medieval warfare, as the subject of conflict will feature heavily in 
the following chapters. As John Gillingham explains: throughout the Middle Ages the 
most common form of encounter was the siege; indeed battle itself was often avoided 
due to risk, since its outcome could be decisive both for the loser as well as the 
victor.
40
 A prime example of this was William’s victory over the Norman rebels led 
by Guy of Burgundy at Val-ès-Dunes (1047); for in a single act he both, crushed a 
potential claimant to the ducal crown and also re-asserted his authority as duke.
41
 
However, not all battles proved decisive. In South-Italy for instance, Rainulf, count of 
Alife defeated Roger II on the field at Scafati, in July 1132, only for the king to return 
a month later and ravage much of the rebels’ lands.42 For a medieval prince battle also 
brought a terrible fear of serious injury, shame, capture or even death; and as such, 
when attacking most generals preferred to force an enemy’s submission by ravaging 
their lands.
43
 In fact, it was even written by the tactician Vegetius (author of a late 
Roman handbook on war, widely used in medieval Europe): that ‘the main and 
principal point in war is to secure plenty of provisions for oneself and to destroy the 
enemy by famine.’44 This method was used by William; with one example being the 
recovery of Maine (1073); for as stated by the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: he ‘completely 
devastated the countryside, and brought’ the province under his ‘subjection’.45 
 
In terms of structure, the thesis itself will be separated into three chapters, followed by 
a conclusion. The first two chapters will concentrate on the Normans in Northern 
                                                 
39
 J. A. Green, ‘Robert Curthose Reassessed’, in C. Harper-Bill (eds.), Anglo-Norman studies XXII: 
Proceedings of the Battle Conference 1999 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000), pp.97-100 
40
 Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, in Strickland, ‘Anglo-Norman Warfare’, p.147 
41
 Douglas, ‘William the Conqueror’, p.49 
42
 Matthew, ‘The Norman Kingdom of Sicily’, p.43 
43
 Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, in Strickland, ‘Anglo-Norman Warfare’, p.150 
44
 W. Goffart, ‘The Date and Purpose of Vegetius’ De Re Militari’, Traditio, Vol. 33 (1977), pp.70-75 
45
 G. N. Garmonsway (trans.), The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1953), 
p.209 
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Europe, both before and after 1066; whilst the third chapter will look at the Normans 
in Southern Italy and Sicily. The first chapter will focus primarily on ducal authority, 
from the reigns of Duke Richard II to William the Conqueror (although, there will be 
some references made to earlier tenth-century rulers). This is in order to determine the 
extent of Richard II’s authority, as well as that of his sons; and also to illustrate how 
internal anarchy within Normandy during the 1030s and 1040s helped to facilitate, 
both a rise in ducal authority and the conquest of major territory during the 1060s – 
notably that of Maine and England.
46
 
 
The second chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will focus primarily 
on how internal chaos – after William’s initial conquest of England – helped the 
Normans to tighten their grip over the English landscape; whilst highlighting also, the 
domestic status of both England and Normandy prior to the death of King William in 
September 1087, so as to illustrate the evenness of his power (royal and ducal) in both 
territories.
47
 The next two sections will investigate: firstly, the rule of Robert Curthose 
in Normandy, and how his failure to deal with troublesome lords led to a rapid decline 
in ducal authority. And secondly, his rule will then be compared to the rules of both 
William Rufus and Henry I in England, in order to illustrate that a major factor behind 
their success was their ability to deal with troublesome elements early. This was also 
one of the reasons why Robert lost control of Normandy in 1106 to his brother, Henry 
– as this chapter will show.48 
 
And finally, much like the second chapter, the third will also be divided into (two this 
time) sections. The first will focus on the career of Robert Guiscard. This is in order 
to show what effects revolts in Apulia had on ducal authority, and how they helped to 
dictate the flow of conquest (plus the rule of Robert’s son will also be analysed). After 
this, the second section will then examine Norman Sicily, and the rule of Roger II, so 
as to identify how early revolts against his leadership (in Southern Italy) helped to 
                                                 
46
 Chibnall, ‘The Normans’, pp.29-45 
47
 D. Bates, William the Conqueror (Stroud: Tempus, 2001), p.204 
48
 Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. VI, p.285 
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strengthen the bonds that held the newly formed Norman kingdom together. Also, this 
chapter will look at the long-term benefits of punishing rebels severely. 
 
Sources 
 
Each chapter will be supported by primary evidence. This will consist of information 
extracted mainly from chronicles or histories written during the eleventh- and twelfth-
century; in some cases written shortly after the events they describe. In addition to 
this, there will also be further evidence taken, to support the argument of this thesis, 
from treaties, charters and other contemporary documents; which will be acquired 
primarily from books, such as, Recueil des actes des ducs de Normandie de 911 à 
1066, by Marie Fauroux (1961),
49
 and from the English Historical Documents series, 
which was edited by D. C. Douglas.
5051
 
 
In terms of chronicle sources which will be used in the first chapter, those from the 
eleventh-century will consist, primarily, of the Deeds of the Dukes of the Normans 
written by the Norman monk, William of Jumièges (the date it was written is between 
the late 1050s to c.1070); a particularly useful source, since it contains information on 
every revolt that occurred within the history of early Normandy;
52
 and also The Five 
Books of the Histories written by the Cluniac monk, Ralph Glaber (before 1047); a 
non-Norman, who – unlike William of Jumièges – acquired much of his information 
on the Normans from sources close to the Italian reformer, William of Volpiano (who 
reformed the Norman Church at the request of Richard II: as mentioned before); and 
was therefore subject to less pro-Norman bias.
53
 As well as these sources, the first 
chapter will also feature evidence from histories produced in the twelfth-century, such 
                                                 
49
 M. Fauroux (eds.), Recueil des actes des ducs de Normandie de 911 à 1066 (Caen: Caron, 1961) 
50
 D. Whitelock & D. C. Douglas (eds.), English Historical Documents I: 500-1042 (Eyre Methuen: 
Oxford University Press, 1979) 
51
 D. C. Douglas & G. W. Greenway (eds.), English Historical Documents II 1042-1189 (Oxford: Eyre 
Methuen, 1981) 
52
 E. M. C. Van Houts (trans.), The Gesta Normannorum Ducum of William of Jumièges, Orderic 
Vitals, and Robert of Torigni, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Vol. I, pp.i-xv 
53
 J. France (trans.), Rodulfus Glaber: The Five Books of the Histories (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1989), 
p.xxi 
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as, the Ecclesiastical History written by the Anglo-Norman monk of Saint-Evroult, 
Orderic Vitalis (writing between 1110 and c.1142); a man who, despite often praising 
the Normans for their achievement, did not shy away from highlighting the negatives 
to their warlike nature;
54
 for indeed, to Orderic, the Normans were a race who seemed 
to enjoy war a little too much and as such, his text often criticised their use of cruelty 
when it went too far.
55
 His work is, therefore, considered to be ‘an honest and truthful 
guide to the history of his times’, by historian C. Warren Hollister.56 A further history 
from the twelfth-century which will also be used is Deeds of the Kings of the English 
by the English scholar William of Malmesbury (completed in 1125);
57
 who, according 
to Hollister, was ‘well versed in the literature of classical, patristic and early medieval 
times’.58 And indeed, was perhaps ‘the most learned man in twelfth-century Western 
Europe’.59 His text will, therefore, provide useful evidence to support the argument of 
this thesis. And finally, the last source which will feature, predominantly, in the first 
chapter is the Roman de Rou; a twelfth-century poem which was commissioned by 
King Henry II (1154 – 89) and written by Wace.60 The poem itself documents many 
of the events (such as revolts) which occurred in early Normandy, especially during 
the reign of William II; and is therefore a highly useful source. 
 
For the most part, the sources which will be used in the second chapter will be much 
the same as those used in the first (although both the texts of Ralph Glaber and Wace 
will not be used). However, in addition to these, there will also be evidence – which 
will be extracted to support the chapter’s argument – from three further histories. The 
first is the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle – which is a collection of annals that document the 
history of the Anglo-Saxon and British peoples from around 60 BC to 1154.
61
 The 
text also gives a much needed English perspective – as most of the sources mentioned 
                                                 
54
 Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. I, pp.vii-xxv 
55
 E. M. C. Van Houts, The Normans in Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p.77 
56
 C. W. Hollister, Henry I (London: Yale University Press, 2003), p.6 
57
 Mynors et al, ‘William of Malmesbury’, pp.v-xxx 
58
 Hollister, ‘Henry I’, p.3 
59
 Ibid., p.3 
60
 G. S. Burgess & E. M. C. Van Houts (trans.), The History of the Norman People: Wace’s “Roman de 
Rou” (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004), p.xi 
61
 Van Houts, ‘The Normans in Europe’, pp.134-142 
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above contain a slight pro-Norman bias – on the Norman activities in England after 
1066. Also the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle was utilised as a source by the final two 
twelfth-century histories which will be used in the second chapter. These are the 
History of the English People by Henry the archdeacon of Huntingdon (completed in 
1135),
62
 and the Chronicle of John of Worcester written before 1140.
63
 Naturally, 
both sources will provide useful information concerning the deeds of King William I, 
and his sons. 
 
For the third chapter however, the sources will be mostly different. This is due to the 
fact that the events, which will be analysed, occurred in a different part of Europe – in 
Southern Italy and Sicily. Similar to the first chapter the sources will be derived both 
from the eleventh- and twelfth-century. Those from the eleventh will comprise of: The 
History of the Normans written by Amatus of Montecassino (in c.1080),
64
 Deeds of 
Robert Guiscard by William of Apulia (which is a poem written in Latin hexameters, 
in c.1096 – 99, that was dedicated to Robert’s son, Roger Borsa),65 and The Deeds of 
Count Roger and his brother Duke Robert written by the Benedictine monk, Geoffrey 
Malaterra (in c.1098 – 1101).66 Note: that each author is believed to have been of an 
Italo-Norman origin (and maybe even pure Norman in the case of Geoffrey Malaterra, 
who frequently refers to ‘our men’ in his text);67 and as such, they often portray the 
Normans in a favourable light – ‘as being just and merciful’, for example.68 However, 
the chroniclers do provide useful information on the career of Robert Guiscard. 
 
In addition to these, there is useful information on Robert contained in the Alexiad; a 
twelfth-century text written by the Byzantine princess, Anna Comnena (somewhere 
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between c.1138 and the mid-1150s);
69
 who incidentally was the daughter of Emperor 
Alexius Comnenus (1081 – 1118), one of Guiscard’s enemies.70 Although much of 
the text is biased against the Normans as they attacked the empire, it does provide 
useful information on their activities in the Balkans, as well as a very detailed portrait 
of Robert’s personal traits.71 And finally, the last two sources which will be used, 
predominantly, in this chapter will be The Deeds Done by King Roger of Sicily by the 
abbot of S. Salvatore, Alexander of Telese (written before 1136)
72
 and Chronicon by 
Falco of Benevento (written after 1154).
73
 Each text contains information on the reign 
of Roger II; information which is not biased towards him.
74
 In fact, they even display 
a tendency to highlight the king’s cruelty; especially when it came to how he dealt 
with lords that questioned his authority (note that other sources will also be used in 
each chapter, but to a lesser extent).
75
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Chapter One
Ducal Authority in Eleventh Century 
Normandy – Before 1066 
 
 
In 996 Richard I was succeeded as the ruler of Normandy by his son, Richard II (996 
– 1026).1 Like his father, the younger Richard was considered by many eleventh- and 
twelfth-century chroniclers to be an ‘extremely powerful’ duke; both admired for his 
military skill and for his ability to maintain internal order during a period dominated 
by much instability (within France).
2
 Indeed, it was written by Cluniac monk, Ralph 
Glaber (writing in Burgundy before 1047) that ‘the duke surpassed all men in military 
might, in his desire for a general peace, and in his liberality.’3 However, despite these 
claims, unlike his contemporaries – such as, the buccaneering counts of Anjou and of 
Blois-Chartres – Richard II made little, if any, territorial gains; and as such, perhaps 
he was not as powerful as the chroniclers imply.
4
 Of course, conquest did occur much 
later, but this was during the reign of Duke William II (1035 – 87). The following 
paragraphs will therefore examine the true extent of eleventh-century ducal authority, 
firstly prior to the reign of William. This will be followed by an examination into the 
anarchy that occurred at the beginning of William’s reign, in order to illustrate how 
this helped to strengthen ducal authority and helped to facilitate conquest. 
 
In the history of Normandy prior to 1066, it has been argued by John Le Patourel that 
there were two distinct phases in the evolution of the region.
5
 The first is known as 
the ‘Viking phase’.6 This was where Rollo, and his direct successors, firstly formed a 
robber state and lived largely off plunder. The second or ‘feudal phase’ on the other 
                                                 
1
 T. Rowley, The Normans (London: Tempus, 2004), p.32 
2
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5
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6
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hand began towards the end of the tenth-century, and it was here, where the Normans 
transformed Normandy into a contemporary Frankish-principality.
7
 This was achieved 
by adopting the French language, Christianity and by developing a feudal order; one 
where the close relatives of the duke were granted the title of count; initially by 
Richard II after 1010.
8
 Furthermore, each count was given possession of a castle and 
was also responsible for the defence of a sensitive border region (also see appendix 
one).
9
 By empowering his relatives Richard II was able to extend his authority beyond 
the reaches of Rouen, thereby obtaining a far greater control over the landscape than 
previously achieved during the ‘Viking phase’. Additionally, the counts also formed a 
military-élite, which assisted the duke by helping him to maintain both internal and 
external peace. For example, it was Richard’s uncle Rodulf (later count of Ivry) who 
crushed the peasants’ revolt in 996.10 As Wace noted, he captured the leaders and ‘had 
their feet… and hands cut off’.11 And similarly, after a dispute between Robert I and 
Alan III, count of Brittany, in 1033, it was Archbishop Robert of Rouen (also count of 
Évreux) who ‘reconciled his two nephews making them both promise peace’.12 
 
Nevertheless once established, these new lords soon became dissatisfied with the land 
they had been granted, and as a result, they began to acquire more by conducting in 
private warfare. For instance, as indicated by Orderic Vitalis: during the time of Duke 
Robert I (1027 –35), Count Gilbert of Brionne – ‘chafing to enlarge his estates’ – tried 
to seize the ‘canton of Le Vimeu’ but was beaten back ‘in a pitched battle’ by Count 
Enguerrand of Ponthieu; whilst more successfully, Humphrey, lord of Pont-Audemer, 
extended his lands by seizing the estates of Beaumont, Beaumontel and Vieilles from 
the Abbey of Bernay.
13
 For the majority of his reign, Robert’s rule suffered as a 
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consequence of internal disorder; although as sources from the abbeys of Jumièges 
and St-Wandrille suggest: it was the duke’s own reluctance to restrain his ‘perverse’ 
aristocracy, which led to a decline in ducal authority;
14
 a decline that continued after 
his death in July 1035 (to be discussed in more detail later).
15
 However, Robert I was 
not the only duke prior to William II whose authority was weakened by troublesome 
lords; for – as argued by David Bates – even though William I of Bellême rebelled 
against Robert in 1028, in order ‘to cast off the yoke of service’16, the earliness and 
ferocity of the revolt suggests that William was perhaps causing problems during the 
final years of Richard II.
17
 
 
The problem (for Richard), here, as noted by Orderic Vitalis, was that unlike other 
Norman lords, the family of Bellême held most of their land outside of Normandy as 
much of their estates resided within the counties of Perche and Maine.
18
 Avesgaud of 
Bellême for example, held the bishopric of Le Mans ‘until his death’ in c.1035.19 By 
owning estates within multiple regions, the Bellêmes’ were, thus, able to establish (in 
the eleventh-century) a quasi-independent territory that was located partly within the 
south-western perimeter of Normandy in an area where William I of Bellême ‘held 
Alençon as a fief’ of Richard II from 1025 (William’s son Ivo, also ‘became bishop of 
Séez in 1035’).20 In addition, this rise in power was also accomplished by taking 
advantage of a lack of ducal authority in Lower (south-west) Normandy; for although 
Richard II had extended his influence by empowering his relatives, the bulk of ducal 
power still remained, at this point, in Upper (north-east) Normandy (a point illustrated 
by the distribution of Richard’s vassals).21 In fact, it was only after William II crushed 
the western rebels in 1047 – led by the traitors Guy of Burgundy, Nigel, vicomte of 
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the Cotentin, and Rannulf, vicomte of the Bessin – that ducal power became firmly 
established within the lower region; since William himself deliberately fostered the 
expansion of Caen in order to provide a power-base for ducal authority, so as to 
prevent further rebellion.
22
 This development, along with the construction of two new 
abbeys (Sainte-Trinité erected in c.1059 and Saint-Étienne in c.1063)
23
 and a stone 
castle (in 1060) at Caen, also helped to integrate upper and lower Normandy into a 
single political unit; something which William’s predecessors had failed to achieve.24 
Although in Richard’s case, this was probably due to a lack of necessity, since unlike 
William, he did not have to deal with constant challenges to his authority; hence the 
requirement to tighten ducal control within certain areas was non-existent. 
 
In fact, the only major domestic dispute that Richard suffered was the peasants’ revolt 
at the beginning of his reign (996).
25
 After this, his rule was remarkably peaceful; so 
much so that in May 1023 he declined to introduce the Peace of God (a Church policy 
to limit private warfare) within Normandy due to a lack of necessity.
26
 However, as a 
medieval prince, Richard was involved in a number of military campaigns. These 
included, according to William of Jumièges: two in support of his ally, King Robert II 
the Pious (996 – 1031); the first of which was in Burgundy (1003 – 05) following ‘a 
rebellion’ to royal authority ‘in the city of Auxerre’; whilst the second was in Flanders 
against Count Baldwin IV.
27
 In addition to this, the duke also engaged in a border-war 
against Odo II, count of Blois-Chartres in 1013 – 14, after a dispute concerning ‘the 
guardianship of the castle of Dreux’.28 In the first of these campaigns however, the 
true extent of Richard’s involvement is rather questionable; for whereas Norman 
sources – such as William of Jumièges – suggest that he sent ‘a large army’29, certain 
French sources – like Ralph Glaber – on the other hand, tend to imply that his troops 
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behaved more like mercenaries under the command of the French king, and as such 
they were fewer in number.
30
 Indeed, in military terms, it is even doubtable whether 
Richard actually possessed the resources necessary to deploy a large army; as when 
engaged against the powerful Count Odo (his only major war), he decided ‘to ask for 
help from… overseas’31 by hiring a huge number of Viking mercenaries; an indication 
perhaps, of Norman military weakness during this period.
32
 
 
Indeed, the limits of Richard’s military capabilities become clearer when compared to 
the achievements of other territorial princes. For instance during this period, Fulk III 
Nerra, count of Anjou (987 – 1040) was able – unlike Richard – to expand his domain 
by acquiring authority over the counties of Maine and Touraine; which was achieved 
via a combination of military skill and steady consolidation (also similar to Fulk, in 
1019, Odo II expanded his lands by annexing the county of Champagne).
33 
In addition 
to this, Fulk was also engaged – again unlike Richard – in a number of large pitched-
battles; the most significant of which was against his main rival Count Odo II in July  
1016; where according to one Angevin monk (in c.1100): ‘Odo’s knights could not 
withstand the ferocious blows of the men of… Anjou, and were put to flight… and 
slaughtered’.34 The victory was a clear display of his military strength. As suggested 
Richard’s lack of involvement in major military activities during this period is 
somewhat peculiar; and indeed, when compared to the actions of his predecessors – 
William Longsword’s (928 – 42) ‘unremitting’ expansion ‘of the duchy on all sides’, 
for example
35
 – it would appear that the Normans had lost the very ruthlessness and 
fighting strength on which the duchy had been founded; possibly as a consequence of 
the almost continuous peace which existed within Normandy from the second half of 
Richard I’s reign to until Richard II’s death in August 1026.36 And finally, this point 
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is also further supported by Ralph Glaber, who suggests that Richard’s troops whilst 
in Flanders (as mentioned above) were notably ‘undisciplined’; thus indicating that 
they lacked regular practice in the martial arts.
37
 
 
However, this is not to say that Richard II was a particularly weak ruler; since what he 
lacked in military strength, he more than made up for with political skill – as in order 
to defend his borders, the duke decided to ally himself to a number of powerful rulers; 
namely, King Robert II (which continued his father’s alliance) and Geoffrey, count of 
Brittany.
38
 Incidentally the latter was formed, as William of Jumièges explains, by the 
marriage of Richard’s sister, Havise to Geoffrey in c.997.39 After this, Richard then 
married Geoffrey’s sister, Judith in c.1003, so as to create a strong bond of ‘friendship 
and assistance’; thereby securing Normandy’s western border.40 This relationship also 
allowed Richard to obtain Breton auxiliaries, which he used in his war against Odo II 
in 1013 – 14 (prior to this conflict Odo had been allied to the duke, via his marriage to 
Matilda, Richard’s sister – she died before the war).41 Yet these alliances were not the 
only source of Richard’s power; as significantly, it was his ability to summon military 
aid from Scandinavia, which prevented other rulers from attacking him; for as Ralph 
Glaber wrote: ‘far from the other nations terrorising them, the fear they inspired (the 
Normans and their Viking allies) terrified foreign peoples’.42 Thus to sum up: it was 
clearly not Richard’s own military strength which made him powerful. Instead, it was 
his ability to call upon support from a number of allies. 
 
By maintaining links with Scandinavia, Normandy’s wealth increased during the late 
tenth- and early eleventh-century, as a result of Viking plunder being sold at Norman 
ports, such as Rouen. In fact, it was even recorded in 1003 that Richard II signed a 
treaty with the Danish king, Sven Forkbeard, which allowed the Danes to use Norman 
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ports – when attacking the English shoreline – in return for a share of the loot.43 This 
act did however, violate a previous treaty of non-alignment (sponsored by Pope John 
XV) signed between Richard I and King Æthelred the Unready (978 – 1016), whereby 
both rulers agreed, in March 991, not to aid their respective ‘enemies’.44 In short, this 
continued connection with Scandinavia made Richard II a tremendously wealthy 
ruler; a wealth which was used, by the duke, to construct a large number of churches, 
monasteries and castles (as mentioned in the introduction).
45
 However, not all of this 
‘legendary wealth’ was generated by external means, since a significant part of it 
came from a particularly sophisticated system of internal taxation; a system which, 
according to the American historian C. H. Haskins (1909), ‘was in advance of 
neighbouring lands such as the county of Anjou or the royal domain’.46 This financial 
prosperity was further helped by Richard’s maintenance of internal peace. 
 
After the death of Richard II in August 1026, the control of Normandy passed briefly 
into the hands of the duke’s eldest son, Richard III (1026 – 27).47 Like his father, the 
younger Richard continued to protect Normandy’s borders by maintaining links with 
a number of powerful allies, one of whom was the French monarch Robert II, whose 
daughter Adela was betrothed to the young duke (although by this point Norman ties 
with Scandinavia had been broken).
48
 Furthermore, Richard III was also considered to 
be a relatively skilled general, as he was involved in a number of successful military 
campaigns. These included, according to William of Jumièges: one in Burgundy, in 
1020, against Hugh, count of Chalon; where Richard laid ‘waste the countryside’ after 
Hugh ‘had refused to hand over’ his brother-in-law, Reginald.49 And another against 
his brother, Robert (1026); who – dissatisfied with his inheritance (he was made count 
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of Hièmois)
50
 – chose to rebel against the duke by seizing control of ‘the stronghold 
of Falaise’; only for Richard to then lay ‘siege to him’, and reduce the fortress ‘using 
battering-rams and siege-engines’.51 Even though brief, the rule of Richard III was 
similar in many ways to Richard II’s, since it was a rule of internal peace (Robert’s 
revolt was the only major domestic dispute), economic prosperity and still limited 
military power. However, Richard III died less than a year into his reign, possibly 
from ‘poison’ or possibly, as several sources suggest, at the hands of Robert, his 
brother and successor.
52
 For instance, William of Malmesbury names ‘Ralph Mowin’ 
as Robert’s agent in his brother’s murder.53 
 
The rule of the next duke, Robert I – as previously mentioned – suffered due to his 
inability to restrain the ‘debauched’ actions of many troublesome barons.54 Instead, 
Robert seemed to be more anxious to focus his efforts on revenge since he decided, in 
1028, to attack his distinguished uncle, Archbishop Robert of Rouen and his cousin, 
Hugh, bishop of Bayeux; both of whom had supported Richard III during the siege of 
Falaise in 1026 (as noted above).
55
 Thus, as a result of such actions and in-actions (his 
unwillingness to control private warfare), Robert I is generally considered to be a 
much weaker ruler than both his father and brother. However, this is not to say that 
everything about his rule was disastrous – as by crushing two revolts in particular, he 
did successfully increase ducal authority in two areas of Lower Normandy where it 
had previously been weak. The first was along the Norman-Breton border, where to 
tighten his grip over the landscape, he built a castle at Cherruiex (1033), after Count 
Alan III tried to break his oath of fealty by raiding Avranchin (the Normans were the 
dominant party in the Norman-Breton alliance).
56
 Wace also noted that Robert ‘lay 
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waste’ to Dol in retaliation.57 As for the second, this was on the south-western border 
of Normandy, where treacherously – as noted before – William I of Bellême chose to 
rebel against the duke in 1028 by fortifying himself in ‘the fortress of Alençon’.58 His 
eventual surrender, thus, helped to strengthen ducal authority within the region. 
 
Furthermore, this increase in military activity also seems to have had a positive effect 
on the Normans’ martial strength. Indeed, as argued by David Crouch: in terms of 
‘foreign adventures’ the campaigns of Robert I ‘were far more aggressive’ than ‘his 
father’s’.59 This point is best illustrated by Robert’s actions in Flanders – in aid of 
Count Baldwin IV against his son, Baldwin V – since here, the Norman forces are 
described by William of Jumièges as being ‘like a fearsome whirlwind’, which ‘upon 
arrival at the stronghold of Choques… seized it and burnt it’.60 The act was sufficient 
to shock Baldwin V into making peace with his father at Oudenarde in 1030.
61
 Also in 
addition to this, Robert was able to gain control (in part) over the French Vexin
62
 (the 
first territorial gain of the eleventh-century); a reward for helping King Henry I (1031 
– 60) to recover his crown after he was ousted by his stepmother Queen Constance in 
1033.
63
 His exile incidentally is recorded at the Abbey of St-Wandrille, since a charter 
noted: ‘at this time’ (1033) the king ‘was a fugitive maintained in this land’.64 In 
military terms, therefore, the rule of Robert I was partly prosperous; with his troops 
seemly far stronger than the ‘undisciplined’ ones (as noted before) that were deployed 
previously by his father Richard II; an improvement which must have developed from 
the dramatic increase in internal warfare during this period; and indeed, it may even 
be fair to say, that had Robert been able to control his aristocracy, by re-asserting his 
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authority, then potentially, he could have been a much stronger duke overall than both 
his father and brother. 
 
However, by failing to resolve this issue, the problem of internal disorder passed into 
the reign of William II and thrive throughout the 1040s; This accumulated in a major 
revolt to the duke’s authority in 1047; a revolt which – as noted before – was quelled 
in a pitched-battle at Val-ès-Dunes.
65
 From this point, William II quickly began to 
take a more pro-active approach than his father against troublesome lords by, firstly, 
introducing the Truce of God in 1047 to limit private warfare, and by attacking castles 
that had been erected in ‘seditious zeal’.66 In addition to this, the duke was also forced 
to suppress two further revolts: one in Lower Normandy, where the count of Anjou, 
Geoffrey Martel (1040 – 60) had taken ‘possession of the fortress of Domfront (and 
Alençon) with support of its rebellious garrison’ in 1051;67 and a second in 1053, 
against his uncle, William, count of Arques; who had also acquired additional support 
from King Henry I.
68
 However, in the end the king was no match for the Napoleonic 
resourcefulness of the duke and was beaten back at St-Aubin-sur-Scie; leaving Count 
William – ‘stricken with famine’ – to submit.69 With each victory, William’s power 
simply kept on growing, until by the mid-1050s his authority was absolute. In short, 
he had become, as described by a monk at Marmoutier (1055), the ‘ruler of his whole 
land’, since every major family had been forced, as a result of his violent approach, to 
accept his authority; even those on the very fringes of Normandy.
70
 This was an 
accomplishment never before achieved by a Norman ruler. 
 
On the back of this success, William also began to further increase ducal authority by 
tightening his grip over the Norman aristocracy, via the enforcement of several strict 
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policies. These included: his right to forbid the unlicensed construction of castles, to 
enforce the payment of knight-service and to garrison any noble’s castle for his own 
personal use; as well as the right to exile any lord for defiance.
71
 Indeed, it is said: 
William was ‘stern beyond measure to those who opposed his will.’72 This point is 
illustrated by the disinheritance of William Werlenc, count of Mortain in c.1055 for 
acts of treason;
73
 and by the ‘service of one hundred knights’ imposed on Count Guy 
of Ponthieu, in 1056, as a punishment for assisting King Henry I and Geoffrey Martel 
in their unsuccessful invasion of Normandy in 1054.
74
 However, not all of William’s 
polices incidentally were designed to restrict and punish, as similar to his grandfather 
Richard II, he too advanced the status of certain loyal, new lords – men whose power 
had increased during the anarchy of the 1030s and 1040s (men such as, William fitz 
Osbern, Roger of Montgomery, Roger of Beaumont and William of Warenne) – so as 
to reinforce ducal authority; although unlike Richard, the distribution of their lands 
was far more diverse and not mostly concentrated in Upper Normandy (as mentioned 
before); hence the control that William had over the whole of the duchy was much 
tighter.
75
 These men would also play a vital role in the duke’s military endeavours by 
supporting him, for instance, in both the conquests of Maine and England. 
 
Indeed, the society that William created – a society based on the principle of a feudal 
order with the duke at its head – was by far ‘one of the most fully developed feudal 
societies in Europe’76 by 1066; an achievement which could only have occurred as a 
result of the power William held by the mid-1050s (after the victory at Mortemer); a 
power which was used, by the duke, to enforce military demands upon both his 
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secular and ecclesiastical aristocracy; thereby massively increasing his own military 
potential.
77
 He was more powerful than either Richard II or Robert I. This is 
particularly important since it was both the swiftness with which internal discontent 
was quelled and the new extent of ducal authority (after the anarchy), which allowed 
William to be in a position of great strength by the 1060s; a position whereby, for the 
first time in the eleventh-century, major conquest was possible. Although it is worth 
noting that, as recorded in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, both of the duke’s main rivals 
King Henry I and Geoffrey Martel died in 1060, which further strengthened William’s 
position, since it removed the threat of external invasion.
78
 
 
This was not the only time, however, in the history of Normandy prior to 1066, where 
early internal disorder, followed by the re-assertion of authority led to later prosperity. 
As much like William’s, the rule of Richard I (942 – 96) suffered initially – from a 
uprising in Bayeux led by a Viking named Harold (942)
79
 and at the hands of King 
Louis IV who invaded in ‘an effort to get rid of the Norman nuisance’ in 945 – before 
ducal power was re-established.
80
 Afterwards, Richard I used his newly acquired 
authority to consolidate the Normans’ position, by implementing a number of political 
reforms (the feudal phase: as mentioned before); acts that would secure Normandy’s 
survival. Furthermore, Richard was also responsible, as sources suggest, for beginning 
a monastic revival within the region, as he restored the major abbeys of St-Wandrille, 
Mont-St-Michel (966) and Fécamp.
81
 Thus in short: it seems clear that initial internal 
disorder could be beneficial, as two of the most successful rulers of early Normandy 
began their reigns’ in this manner, before internal peace was restored. 
 
And finally: it seems that the initial anarchy at the start of William’s reign also had a 
positive effect, as it did during Robert’s rule, on the Normans’ martial strength; which 
in turn, helped to facilitate conquest. Indeed, as observed by Marjorie Chibnall: 
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victory was achieved at Hastings (1066) partly because ‘the core of the Norman army 
was a force of fighting men seasoned in the many wars the duke had fought’.82 But, it 
was not only troops that benefited, since William himself also gained valuable 
experience of generalship during this period of chaos. This experience was used later 
to help facilitate the conquests of Maine (1063) and England. For example, the use of 
‘fear’ to force an enemy’s submission was first used, by the duke, during the siege of 
Alençon in 1051; where according to Wace: after taking an outlying fort, he brutalised 
those he captured by having the ‘hands and feet’ of ‘thirty-two’83 men cut off.84 His 
cruelty, thus, persuaded the people of Alençon to surrender.
85
 This tactic was later 
repeated during the conquest of Maine, as here William ‘destroyed vineyards, fields 
and estates’, in order to terrify the local populace into accepting his authority.86 And 
likewise, the Bayeux Tapestry also depicts the duke’s men torching houses in Wessex, 
most likely, so as to goad Harold into a speedy confrontation, thus giving William the 
advantage of being more prepared.
87
 Good preparation and sufficient supplies were 
regarded as further factors behind the duke’s success at Hastings – as shown on the 
Bayeux Tapestry.
88
 Again, their value was probably recognised by William II during 
his early reign, in the period of initial disorder, since he was involved in numerous 
sieges. 
 
In conclusion, it seems reasonably clear that although Richard II was a very rich and 
powerful duke (due to his allies), the continuous peace that existed from the second 
half of Richard I’s rule right through until the end of Richard II’s did, however, have a 
negative effect on the Normans’ military strength, and as such Richard is considered 
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to be militarily a much weaker ruler than many of his contemporaries. In fact, it was 
only after the anarchy of the 1030s and the 1040s that the Normans, and particularly 
William (although militarily Robert I is also considered to be a lot more powerful than 
Richard II), emerged to be militarily powerful; thereby illustrating that disorder, and 
especially early disorder in William’s case, can be advantageous; as unlike Richard II, 
William was able to conqueror large amounts of territory. Furthermore, the disorder 
(and rebellions) suffered by William at the start of his rule, also helped to strengthen 
and extend (particularly into Lower Normandy) ducal authority; with William again 
emerging by the mid-1050s, as one of the most powerful rulers of Normandy, since he 
possessed a much tighter hold over the landscape than had ever been achieved before. 
In addition to tightening his authority, this disorder also provided the perfect training 
ground for William to sharpen his skills as a duke, so that by the 1060s, the years of 
conquest, he had become as stated by R. Allen Brown: ‘a prince of proven worth… a 
master of politics, war and the management of men’.89 
 
                                                 
89
 R. A. Brown, The Normans and the Norman Conquest (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1969), 
p.178 
University of Chester: 0508605  D13285 
 30 
Chapter Two
Power in Post-Conquest England 
& Normandy – Up until 1106 
 
 
Having defeated the last Anglo-Saxon king, Harold, in a decisive victory, on the field 
of Hastings, William II, duke of Normandy, ‘was crowned on Christmas Day’ 1066 as 
the king of England.
1
 Yet, almost from the very outset, it soon became apparent that 
the rule of this foreign monarch was not to everyone’s pleasing, and as such, much of 
his early reign suffered as a consequence of internal disorder. Undeterred by their 
impertinence, William’s character meant that he was more than able to overcome his 
opponents. Indeed, it was written by a monk at Caen (in the late 1080s), that ‘he never 
allowed himself to be deterred from prosecuting any enterprise because of the labour 
it entailed and he was even undaunted by danger’.2 His powerful rule, thus, lasted for 
nearly twenty-two years until his death in 1087.
3
 After this however, William’s cross-
Channel realm was separated, briefly, into two parts (Normandy and England), before 
being reunited in 1106.
4
 The following paragraphs therefore will be divided into three 
sections. The first will examine how revolts in England helped William to strengthen 
royal authority, while commenting also on his rule in Normandy; whilst the second 
section will analyse the rule of Robert Curthose (in Normandy); and the third will 
compare his rule with the rules of William Rufus and Henry I (in England), so as to 
explain why Robert lost control of Normandy in 1106. 
 
As a result of the Norman Conquest, by the time of William’s death (1087) much of 
English society had been massively transformed, as England had received virtually a 
new Church, new architecture, a new type of art, as well as a new aristocracy and a 
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new language (French).
5
 Indeed, as recorded in Domesday Book, by 1086, less than 
half a dozen of the king’s 180 great tenants-in-chief (controlling around eight per cent 
of all land)
6
 were English; and by 1090, only one of England’s sixteen bishoprics was 
held by an Englishman.
7
 This also meant that French became the dialect of polite 
society, whilst ‘English was relegated to the language of the unprivileged.’8 However, 
this transformation did not take place straight away; instead it occurred after the 
suppression (which strengthened royal authority, thereby helping to push forward this 
transformation) of two large-scale revolts to William’s rule. The first occurred in 
1067 – 68, with revolts in cities – as indicated in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle – such as 
Exeter, Lincoln, Cambridge, Huntingdon, Nottingham and York;
9
 although because of 
their widespread nature the English rebels lacked both co-ordination and leadership 
and as a result, the king ‘easily subdued’ them.10 Afterwards, William utilised this 
opportunity to tighten his grip over the landscape by constructing castles within these 
cities and by assigning many of his loyal lieutenants to administer them – his chosen 
method of control. For example, it was recorded by Orderic Vitalis that in Exeter he 
constructed a castle ‘within the walls’ and left ‘Baldwin of Meules’ to command it11; 
and similarly in York, it was noted by John of Worcester that he built ‘two castles and 
garrisoned them with 500 knights’.12 
 
The second wave of revolts, on the other hand, was far more severe, as this time the 
English rebels (concentrated mostly in the north) were supported, in 1069 – 70, by the 
army (‘240 ships’) of the Danish king, Sweyn Estrithson (and by Malcolm III, king of 
Scotland); which, as noted by John of Worcester, ‘landed at the mouth of the Humber 
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in September 1069’, before then going on to sack the city of York.13 But once again, 
William proved himself to be more than capable of crushing this uprising, as by 
utilising a combination of speed and brutality, he moved systematically against 
individual pockets of resistance; crushed them, and then devastated the surrounding 
landscape so as to prevent any recurrence. In short it was, as argued by D. C. Douglas, 
‘one of the outstanding military achievements of the age’, as ‘it was to prove decisive 
in ensuring that the Norman domination of England would endure’.14 And, it was not 
just the campaign, itself, which proved significant; as in order both to prevent any 
further revolts and to strengthen his authority, William decided to inflict two types of 
punishment. The first, and perhaps most severe, was where Norman troops ‘harried’ 
(devastated) much of Northern England in an effort to remove the region’s ability to 
rebel; though this did result, as Orderic Vitalis wrote (in condemnation), in ‘so terrible 
a famine… that more than 100,000 Christian folk… perished from hunger’.15 As for 
the second: this involved the mass disinheritance of many troublesome English lords 
(William was more lenient during the previous revolt), which significantly included 
the removal of the last great-earls (two of the key rebel leaders), Morcar, earl of 
Northumbria and Edwin, earl of Mercia; an act which meant that for the remainder of 
William’s reign, no English earl possessed the power that, for example, Earl Godwin 
did during the reign of King Edward the Confessor (1042 – 66).16 
 
The manner in which William distributed land was also different to Edward; as in 
order to prevent the build-up of large power-blocks, the new king parcelled out estates 
to his supporters, especially after 1070, over wide areas.
17
 For example, Robert, count 
of Mortain was given land in some twenty counties, whilst the earl of Chester, Hugh 
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d’Avranches held estates in nineteen;18 and overall around twenty of William’s great 
tenants-in-chief held lands within ten or more counties.
19
 The only exception where 
power-blocks did exist was along the Welsh border as the king created, in c.1071, the 
earldoms of Chester and Shrewsbury, and built-up the earldom of Hereford to protect 
against invasion (the earldom of Kent also remained powerful whilst Bishop Odo was 
earl to defend England from continental attack).
20
 However, it was not just the manner 
in which land was distributed that William reformed, but also the way in which it was 
held, as under Norman rule all land now belonged to the king (as conqueror, William 
claimed the whole of England as his); land which was then granted to his tenants to be 
held in return for the payment of knight-service; thus creating a powerful and highly 
centralised feudal system (as noted in the introduction).
21
 As suggested, the way in 
which territory was both held and distributed under Norman rule clearly helped to 
strengthen royal authority, since the English crown was much stronger under William 
than it had ever been under Anglo-Saxon rule. Although, it is important to note: that 
most of William’s land reforms were implemented after 1070 – after he had defeated 
the English rebels.
22
 
 
In addition to strengthening royal authority, by introducing the system of knight-
service into English society, William was able to place himself – much like he did in 
Normandy before 1066 (noted in chapter one) – at the head of a very powerful force 
of knights.
23
 Indeed, it was estimated by R. Allen Brown that as king, William could 
obtain ‘some five thousand knights’ from his English tenants (much more than could 
be obtained from Normandy); men which would both help him to defend his newly 
conquered kingdom and support him in his military endeavours.
24
 For instance, it was 
documented in a writ that in 1072 William ordered Æthelwig, abbot of Evesham, ‘to 
summon all those (knights) who are subject to your… jurisdiction’ and to bring ‘fully 
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equipped those 5 knights which you owe… in respect of your abbacy’, for support in 
a (successful) campaign against Malcolm III, king of Scotland – who had previously 
aided the English rebels.
25
 However, what perhaps is most significant here is not the 
system of knight-service itself, but the date that it was introduced into English society, 
since according to the thirteenth-century chronicler, Matthew Paris (a view accepted 
by historians, such as Douglas), it was in 1070 when William ordered the ‘bishoprics 
and abbacies… to come under military servitude’.26 Once again, the date was after the 
king had suppressed the English rebels, at a time when his authority was strong. 
 
Also, it was not only knights that William could demand (after 1070) from his English 
tenants, since he could obtain financial aid, inheritance tax and scutage (a fee for the 
non-payment of knights); which combined with ‘the Old English taxes’ that ‘made the 
Anglo-Saxon kingdom about the richest in Europe’, and England’s lucrative wool 
trade; meant that as king, he was extremely wealthy.
27
 And of course, it was not just 
the king who was affluent, but his new lords as well; since their English estates were 
worth considerably more than those in Normandy; an issue which would later cause 
problems after William’s death (to be discussed in more detail below).28 To sum up: 
after suffering a period of, and dealing with, initial disorder – as noted before – by the 
1070s William had emerged for the remainder of his reign as an extremely rich and 
powerful king, whose authority within England was very strong. In fact, it was even 
recorded in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle that when Ralph of Gael, earl of East Anglia 
rebelled in 1075, because they feared the king’s wrath, ‘the inhabitants of the country 
opposed him; with the result that he accomplished nothing’.29 
 
Back in Normandy, however, the situation was much different, since the domestic 
peace that existed from the mid-1050s (as noted in chapter one) continued after 1066 
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and lasted up until William’s death in 1087.30 In fact, as suggested by Douglas: this 
peace was also a factor behind the king’s success against the English rebels, since it 
gave him the freedom to concentrate his military efforts in England.
31
 This is not to 
say, however, that throughout this period (1066 – 87) William’s rule on the French 
side of the Channel went without incident, since there was a large revolt in Maine in 
1069 that was finally subdued in 1073 and also a number of external attacks.
32
 These 
came from both the count of Anjou, Fulk le Réchin (1068 – 1109), who, according to 
Orderic Vitalis, assaulted the stronghold of John of La Fléche, one of William’s main 
supporters in Maine in both 1077 and 1081 (Fulk wanted control over Maine);
33
 and 
from the French king, Philip I (1060 – 1108), who gave the castles of Montreuil in 
1075 and Gerberoy in 1078 (situated on the Norman-Capetian border) to William’s 
enemies – Edgar Ætheling and Robert Curthose (who had briefly fallen out with his 
father) respectively – to be used as bases from which to harass Normandy.34 Similar 
to Count Fulk’s, Philip I’s strategy aimed to curb – although with little success – 
William’s growing power; although according to William of Malmesbury (who often 
praised William): his actions were due more to jealousy, since ‘so much glory’ had 
been ‘achieved by someone who was known to have been his father’s man’.35 In short 
by the time of William’s death, much like in England, the situation in Normandy was 
fairly stable; especially since most of the external attacks were directed against 
William and not necessarily against the Normans themselves. 
 
As suggested in the above paragraphs (and in the first chapter), William was, as 
sources indicate, a remarkably powerful ruler of ‘the highest reputation’; a man who 
significantly was both ‘inexorable when dealing with rebellion’36 and ‘stern beyond 
measure to those who opposed his will’.37 Yet, unfortunately, the same cannot be said 
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about his son and successor in Normandy, Robert Curthose; for although he was often 
praised for his chivalry, kind-heartedness, skill in battle and for his bravery whilst on 
the First Crusade in 1096 – 99 (‘under heaven there was no better lord’38), as the duke 
of Normandy he is described by numerous twelfth-century chroniclers as weak; with 
many character faults.
39
 These included, according to Orderic Vitalis: his inability ‘to 
pass judgement on wrongdoers’, his reliance on the opinions ‘of corrupt and foolish 
men’ – as besides Bishop Odo inept advisers were considered to be a factor behind his 
weak rule –40 as well as being rather swift, according to Robert of Torigni, to abandon 
military enterprises before an actual conclusion was reached.
41
 And similarly, Eadmer 
also noted that Robert’s ‘piety and… absence of any desire for worldly wealth’ meant 
that numerous Norman nobles too readily transferred their allegiance to his wealthier 
brothers.
42
 In short, it seems fair to say that most of the chroniclers were fairly critical 
of Robert’s rule, thus giving the somewhat correct impression – as it will be argued – 
that it was ‘one long record of weakness and of failure’.43 
 
What, perhaps, began this record of weakness was Robert’s significant and initial 
failure to subdue completely the troublesome lord, Robert of Bellême. As Orderic 
Vitalis explains: after making peace with King William Rufus (1087 – 1100) in 1088, 
Robert and the Bellême family decided instead to rebel against the duke by fortifying 
their castles of ‘Bellême, Lurson, Essay, Alençon, Domfront, Saint-Céneri, La Roche, 
and Mabille’ against him; thus forcing the duke to take military action.44 Robert’s 
campaign initially began with great success, since ‘he succeeded in bringing Alençon 
and Bellême to the brink of surrender’ and arrested Robert of Bellême himself.45 But 
                                                 
38
 Gaimar, Lestoire des Engleis, in A. Bell, Anglo-Norman Text Society (1960), cited in  J. A. Green, 
‘Robert Curthose Reassessed’, in C. Harper-Bill (eds.), Anglo-Norman studies XXII: Proceedings of 
the Battle Conference 1999 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000), p.99 
39
 D. C. Douglas, The Norman Achievement 1050 – 1100 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1069), p.52 
40
 Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. IV, p.115 
41
 E. M. C. Van Houts (trans.), The Gesta Normannorum Ducum of William of Jumièges, Orderic 
Vitals, and Robert of Torigni, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Vol. II, pp.203-5 
42
 G. Bosanquet (trans.), Eadmer’s History of Recent Events in England (London: The Cresset Press, 
1964), p.176 
43
 C. W. David, Robert Curthose: Duke of Normandy (Cambridge: Mass, 1920), p.75 
44
 Chibnall, ‘The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis’, Vol. IV, p.153 
45
 D. Crouch, The Normans: The History of a Dynasty (London: Hambledon & London, 2002), p.214 
University of Chester: 0508605  D13285 
 37 
unfortunately, just when it seemed as though he was about to bring the rebels to heel, 
the duke decided instead to abandon ‘his show of energy’ and ‘unexpectedly agreed to 
a precarious peace’; one which ‘freed Robert of Bellême from his fetters.’46 This was 
a mistake. Indeed, as Orderic Vitalis once again explains: not only did this mean that 
the ‘dangerously powerful’ Robert of Bellême was again free to wreak havoc in 
Lower Normandy, which he did; but notably it also displayed to his nobles that – 
unlike his father, who mercilessly punished the English rebels, for example, by 
devastating the North of England (as noted before) – Robert was ‘weak’ when it came 
to ‘enforcing justice’;47 and as such, much of his rule suffered (in much the same way 
that Robert I’s did: noted in chapter one) as a consequence of internal disorder, since 
incessant fighting occurred between the great-lords of Bellême, Breteuil, Conches and 
Grentemaisnil, due to Robert’s inability to both enforce and maintain a strong ducal 
authority.
48
 
 
Furthermore, Robert’s lack of authority (combined with the disorder that emerged as a 
result) also seems to have had a negative effect on Normandy’s economy. Indeed, as 
suggested by Judith Green: if the sources ‘are to be believed’, then ‘ducal finances 
were in a woeful state’ by 1106.49 However, it was not just internal chaos that caused 
this problem, since the duke was  accused of squandering Normandy’s vast wealth on 
fruitless military enterprises – such as, his two failed and ill-prepared attempts at 
trying to obtain the English crown in 1088 and 1101
50
 – by mortgaging the county of 
the Cotentin to his brother Henry for 3,000 marks, thereby denying himself of one-
third of the ducal revenue (for a period of time) and also on uncalculated acts of 
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generosity.
51
 Although with the latter, it was argued by Orderic Vitalis that many 
Norman lords also took advantage of Robert’s kind-heartedness, since he wrote: ‘the 
jesters and harlots’ (with reference to his counsellors) constantly ‘boast that they have 
robbed the duke.’52 In short, Robert’s mismanagement of Normandy’s finances, along 
with his inability to maintain internal law and order is, thus, particularly important; as 
not only did it mean that ducal authority was rather weak throughout the principality, 
but also it meant that Normandy itself was more susceptible to attack.  
 
A further factor behind Robert’s downfall was the aggressive actions of his younger 
brothers, who took advantage of his weakness by attacking Normandy in quite similar 
ways on two separate occasions (prior to the conquest of the duchy by Henry in 
1106).
53
 The first was in 1090, where according to William of Malmesbury: William 
Rufus invaded and successfully took control over many castles in Northern 
Normandy, both by gaining the support of local lords – men such as Odo of Aumâle, 
Count Robert of Eu, Walter Giffard and Ralph of Mortimer; all of whom held larger 
estates in England and so were more inclined to unite with the king – and by utilising 
his riches to bribe ‘the men in charge’.54 As for the second: this occurred in 1104 and 
once again, it involved, firstly, many Norman lords in Western Normandy transferring 
their loyalties, this time to King Henry I (1100 – 35); before the king then went on to 
take, as stated by the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, the cities of ‘Caen and Bayeux’.55 But, 
it was not just the actual invasions themselves and the land lost as a result, which was 
damaging to Robert’s rule, since what was perhaps more harmful was the concessions 
that he had to make in order to restore peace on each occasion. These included, for the 
peace of 1091: the surrender to William of ‘the county of Eu and Cherbourg’56 (land 
that the king had already taken), the ‘abbey of Mont-St-Michel’ and also ‘the palace 
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of Fécamp’, which humiliatingly was a key symbol of ducal power.57 And similarly, 
in 1104, Robert also had to surrender to Henry the homage – as recorded by Orderic 
Vitalis – of ‘William, count of Évreux, with his county and all his dependences’; an 
act which ultimately cost the duke the allegiance of a key and powerful vassal.
58
Also, 
Count William would later ally with the king at the Battle of Tinchebrai (1106), as a 
result of this concession.
59
 As suggested, the actions of Robert’s brothers clearly 
helped to further undermine the duke’s authority, since not only did their invasions 
highlight his weakness to an already troublesome aristocracy (which made the internal 
situation more chaotic), but also they showed that he could not sufficiently protect 
Normandy’s borders. The latter proved to be advantageous to Henry in 1106. 
 
In comparison to Robert’s rule, the reigns of his brothers (in England), William and 
Henry were – as it will be argued – considerably more successful; with many sources 
portraying their rules in a much more positive light.
60
 For example, William Rufus is 
described, by William of Malmesbury, as being an incredibly powerful king; hugely 
ambitious, boastful and self-confident; a man whose talents were comparable to those 
of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar.
61
 And equally, Orderic Vitalis also stated, 
that William was ‘a masterful, bold and warlike man’; a king who ‘terrorised thieves 
and robbers and successfully enforced internal peace throughout his realm’; a 
peacefulness which Robert, on the other hand (as mentioned before), failed to achieve 
in Normandy.
62
 In fact, the theme of internal peace when talking about the reigns of 
William and Henry is particularly dominate within the sources; since both Henry of 
Huntingdon (writing before c.1154)
63
 and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle saw the reign of 
Henry I, much like William’s, as a time of peace, law and order: ‘in his days no man 
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dared to wrong another.’64 Although they did suggest, negatively: that at times Henry 
could be overly cruel when it came to enforcing justice and was often ruthless when it 
came to removing disloyal magnates.
65
 In short, it would seem that on the surface the 
rules of both William and Henry were internally somewhat peaceful, as it would 
appear (as the sources clearly suggest) that the seeds of domestic chaos did not 
blossom in England during their reigns, and as such, their rules were in many ways 
more similar to their father’s than to Duke Robert’s. 
 
This is not to imply, however, that the reigns of William and Henry occurred without 
incident, as similar to Robert, both kings had to deal with internal disorder at the start 
of their reigns. In William’s case, this took the form of a major revolt in 1088.66 It was 
here, where, according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, many (including six out of the 
ten greatest baronial landowners as recorded in Domesday Book
67
) of ‘the most 
powerful Frenchmen’ in England, led by Bishop Odo, rose up against William in aid 
of Robert’s claim to the English throne by attacking ‘the lands of all those men who 
owed allegiance to the king’.68 However, like his father, William proved himself to be 
more than capable of crushing this revolt. As Orderic Vitalis explains: after he 
successfully persuaded the powerful earl of Shrewsbury, Roger II of Montgomery to 
switch sides, so as to divide the opposition, the king then went on – by utilising the 
military obligations which his father had put in place (as noted before) – to personally 
attack and capture, ‘with the utmost ferocity’, the strongholds of Tonbridge, Pevensey 
and Rochester, where Odo and the rebel leaders were situated.
69
 His attack displayed 
to the English barons that militarily ‘young William’ was ‘no less powerful than old 
William.’70 However, what was perhaps most significant here, was not just the victory 
itself, but the punishments that the king inflicted, as unlike Robert who was lenient for 
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example to the ‘treacherous count, Robert of Bellême’71 (as noted before), William on 
the other hand, took a more authoritarian stance; since he confiscated the lands of all 
those who rebelled and banished Bishop Odo ‘from England’.72 Afterwards, ‘the king 
gave their lands to men who were more faithful’.73 By punishing his magnates in this 
manner, William was thus able to set, early on in his reign, a precedent that insolence 
to his rule would not be tolerated and that loyalty would be rewarded; which in turn, 
ensured that internal peace, law and order, and not anarchy (at the same time disorder 
thrived in Normandy, because Robert failed to punish rebels harshly), would flourish 
for the majority of his reign.
74
 
 
As indicated above, the rule of Henry I began in a similar manner to that of William’s 
as like his predecessor he too had to deal with early disorder, when in 1102 the great 
house of Bellême-Montgomery (also see appendix four) chose to rebel
75
 by fortifying 
‘the city of Shrewsbury and… the castles of Arundel and Tickhill’ against him.76 But 
again, like his father and his brother William, Henry proved himself to be more than 
capable of dealing with this rebellion. As John of Worcester explains: by quickly and 
aggressively attacking the three brothers – Robert of Bellême, Arnulf and Roger of 
Poitou – ‘within thirty days the city and all the castles had surrendered’.77 Also after 
this, Henry then went on to punish the rebels severely, as he expelled the entire family 
from England and took their ‘whole honor’, along with ‘the estates of the vassals who 
had stood by’ them; an act which in turn, set a significant precedent that – much like 
in his predecessor’s time – treachery, even from the most powerful of families would 
not go unpunished; and as such, internal peace blossomed after 1102.
78
 In fact, it was 
even written by the chronicler Orderic Vitalis that because of his firm stance, ‘Henry 
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reigned prosperously for thirty-three years’ (from 1102 onwards), as ‘no one… dared 
to rebel against him in England’.79 
 
By expelling the troublesome lord, Robert of Bellême, however, Henry seems to have 
unintentionally had a further hand in Duke Robert’s misfortune, since when the lord 
returned to Normandy in 1102, he was able once again to wreak havoc in the south-
western part of the principality, by exploiting the duke’s weak authority and weak 
stance, when it came to enforcing law and order (as mentioned before).
80
 In fact, it 
was even recorded by Orderic Vitalis that cruelly Robert of Bellême destroyed ‘the 
nunnery of Almenèches’ in 1103 and that significantly, in the same year, he defeated a 
ducal army, led by the duke, in a pitched battle near to the castle of Exmes.
81
 This 
defeat further humiliated Duke Robert, since it showed once again that he was unable 
to enforce internal law and order. It also meant that ‘the harsh tyranny of the warlike 
count’ would continue in the south-western region.82 In short, Robert’s inability to 
extinguish (on a number of occasions) the power of the Bellêmes’ meant that he had 
failed, where his brother Henry had succeeded (since he had defeated and banished 
the family) and as such, he was never able to possess the same level of authority in 
Normandy, as his powerful brother possessed in England. 
 
Indeed, by crushing rebellion early, unlike his brother Robert, Henry found himself to 
be in a position of great strength – much like his father was after 1070 (as mentioned 
before) – and as such, he was able to utilise his newly acquired power in order to 
vastly increase his wealth.
83
 This was achieved, firstly, by raising the level of taxation 
across England in order to fund his campaigns against Robert in Normandy;
84
 and 
later, via the implementation (from c.1107 onwards) of numerous governmental and 
administrative reforms; including the introduction of the ‘Exchequer’, which greatly 
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improved how the collection of revenue was managed.
85
And it was not just Henry, 
who was able to benefit from the power that was gained by crushing rebellious 
elements early, as like his younger brother, William Rufus was also able to utilise his 
strong authority – the power that he gained after crushing the revolt of 1088 (as noted 
before) – to boost his wealth. This was achieved again: by the imposition of ‘severe 
and unjust taxes’, according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle;86 and also by demanding 
the payment of large reliefs when a tenant died and was succeeded.
87
 For example, 
after the death of Earl Hugh of Shrewsbury in 1098, his brother Robert of Bellême 
had to pay the enormous relief of £3,000 for the privilege of succeeding him.
88
 In 
addition to this, William also made more money (which was used to fund his military 
campaigns in Normandy) by abusing the Church, ‘since when the head of a bishopric 
or an abbacy died, he either sold’ the vacant seat and attached estates ‘for money or 
kept them within his grasp and let them for rent’.89 As suggested, the true extent of a 
ruler’s wealth was clearly linked to the strength of their authority, and as such, it is 
easy to see why kings, William I, William Rufus and Henry I were rich and why Duke 
Robert was nearly bankrupt. 
 
In conclusion, it seems fairly clear that although initially chaotic, from 1070 onwards 
the reign of King William I was extremely prosperous; an accomplishment which he 
achieved by crushing the English rebels swiftly and by punishing harshly those 
involved. By doing this, the new king was able to strengthen his (royal) authority by 
setting the precedent that insolence to Norman rule would not be tolerated. This also 
insured that internal peace flourished for the remainder of his reign; which in turn, 
helped to facilitate the implementation of reform (such as, land reform and the 
introduction of knight-service) and the acquisition of great wealth. Furthermore, this 
new found prosperity, in England, did not simply die with King William. Indeed, by 
dealing with revolts early and in a similar manner (each uprising was crushed quickly 
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and the rebels were justly punished), both kings, William Rufus and Henry I proved 
themselves to be more than capable of sustaining their father’s legacy, as both rulers 
were remarkably rich and powerful. However, unfortunately the same cannot be said 
about their elder brother Robert, the duke of Normandy; who at the same time, proved 
himself to be incapable of dealing with rebellious elements and as such, his rule was 
very weak; thus proving that, in short, it was how revolts were dealt with (particularly 
early revolts) which determined a ruler’s fate; especially since Robert lost control of 
Normandy in 1106 to Henry as a consequence of his continual weakness. 
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Chapter Three
The Conquest of Southern Italy & Sicily – The  
Birth of a Second Norman Kingdom 
 
 
Established in 1130 with the coronation of Roger II, the twelfth-century kingdom of 
Southern Italy and Sicily is perhaps one the most fascinating creations of the medieval 
period.
1
 For indeed, in its uniqueness the civilisation fostered by the Norman rulers 
was able to combine elements from a variety of different cultures (principally Arabic, 
Greek and Latin), so as to create a society of religious tolerance, intellectual diversity 
and artistic beauty that significantly was unlike anywhere else in Western Europe.
2
 In 
fact, the brilliance of what was created can easily be seen in the cathedrals of Cefalù 
and Monreale, and in the Cappella Palatina at Palermo; all of which contain Byzantine 
mosaics, honeycomb ceilings, pointed arches and occasional inscriptions in Greek or 
Arabic.
3
 However, it was not just the kingdom itself which was remarkable, but also 
how it was formed; and as such, this chapter will focus on some of the Norman rulers 
which made its existence and survival a possibility. To do this, the following 
paragraphs will be divided into two sections. The first will focus on the career of 
Robert Guiscard and the effects that rebellion had on ducal authority in Apulia; whilst 
the second section will look at Sicily and the Norman kingdom, so as to display the 
long-term benefits of punishing rebels severely. 
 
The Normans arrived in Southern Italy throughout the course of the eleventh-century 
– where they quickly proved themselves, to the local populous, to be highly skilled 
warriors.
4
 In short, it was through the utilisation of their skill, discipline, ‘boldness 
and strength’, that allowed them to start wrestling large amounts of land – beginning 
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with Aversa in 1030 and Melfi in 1041 – from the weaker native Greeks, Italians and 
later Muslims.
5
 Also, what helped to facilitate this conquest in the early stages was 
their triumph at the Battle of Civitate in 1053, since here, as recorded by Amatus, the 
Normans, ‘led by Count Humphrey’ (d.1057), were able to vanquish the numerically 
superior army of Pope Leo IX; who had taken to the field in an attempt to expel the 
foreigners from Southern Italy.
6
 His defeat dashed any long-term hopes of removing 
the Norman presence from the peninsula. 
 
However, despite these early achievements, much of the conquest of Southern Italy 
took place slightly later during the reign of Robert Guiscard, who became the Count 
of Apulia in 1057.
7
 According to the Byzantine princess, Anna Comnena, Robert was 
a man of huge physical stature; ‘in mind most cunning, brave in action, very clever in 
attacking the wealth of magnates’, and ‘most obstinate in achievement, for he did not 
allow any obstacle to prevent’ him from ‘executing his desire’.8 It was through his 
military leadership that the Normans were able to conqueror nearly all of Southern 
Italy and parts of Sicily; including the cities of Troia in 1059, Reggio in 1060, 
Messina in 1061, Bari the former Greek capital of Italy in 1071, Palermo the capital 
of Sicily in 1072 and Salerno the capital of the last Lombard principality in 1076.
9
 
Indeed, in terms of military achievement, the career of Robert Guiscard was one of 
great triumph and seeming endless conquest. He was, as regarded by J. J. Norwich, 
‘perhaps the most gifted… soldier of his age’ – equal somewhat in his 
accomplishments to his contemporary William the Conqueror.
10
 And finally, it must 
be said that because of the level of his military triumph, Robert was often depicted by 
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the sources in a superhuman manner.
11
 For instance, it was stated by Anna: that 
because most enemies feared him, his ‘battle cry’ was ‘said to have put thousands to 
flight’; for ‘he was’ – as the princess continues – ‘naturally indomitable and’ was thus 
‘subordinate to nobody in the world’; not the popes nor the emperors from east or 
west, who allegedly ‘trembled before him’12 – because, in truth, on the battlefield he 
had defeated them all.
13
 
 
Nevertheless, regardless of his military achievements, Robert’s rule in Southern Italy 
was not an easy one, as there were a number of major revolts against his rule. These 
occurred in 1067 – 68, in 1072 – 73, in 1079 – 80 and in 1082 – 83; all of which were 
due, in part, because many of Robert’s fellow Norman counts – who were sometimes 
backed with Greek money (for example, it was written that in 1067 Amicus, count of 
Molfetta was ‘lent… 100 hundredweight of gold’ to cause chaos)14– often disliked his 
ever rising demands for them to provide him with military service, and because they 
resented his increasing authority which he excised over them (as duke of Apulia from 
1059, the lords were officially his vassals).
15
 Although slightly differently, William of 
Apulia does suggest: that many of the counts ‘envied’ Robert’s ‘virtues’, and as such, 
‘they… conspired to murder him when they could find a suitable opportunity’.16 Yet, 
it is not necessarily the revolts themselves which are important here, but instead the 
amount of them and the manner in which they were subdued, since although Robert 
was able to utilise his military skill to ‘quickly’ crush – as stressed by Amatus – every 
uprising
17
, his failure to severely punish the rebels on each occasion meant that much 
like the rule of Robert Curthose (1087 – 1106) in Normandy (as mentioned in chapter 
two), he too, suffered terribly at the hands of internal disorder, due to his inability to 
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show a firm hand. Indeed, it was often the case that several of those who rebelled 
against the duke were repeat offenders.
18
 For instance, Count Peter II of Andria took 
up arms against Robert in both 1067 and 1072.
19
 On each occasion he was captured, 
‘but after being bound by an oath of fealty Peter was eventually set free and recovered 
all that he had lost’.20 His punishment was rather lenient. 
 
However, it is perhaps a little harsh to suggest here that Robert was simply a great 
conqueror, but a weak ruler; since the use of severe punishment had to be balanced, 
by the duke, against the constant need for both knights and capable lords to govern 
(and for his army) his ever expanding empire; due to fact that the Normans, in Italy, 
were forever outnumbered.
21
 Hence, the imposition of strong penalties on the rebels – 
such as, permanent banishment, long-term imprisonment or even execution – would 
have been counterproductive; a problem which Robert Curthose, on the other hand, 
did not have in Normandy, since there were few limitations on his ability to discipline 
those who rebelled severely. He just failed to do so (as noted in chapter two). Also, it 
must be noted here: that to sustain an air of legitimacy amongst the indigenous Greek 
and Italian populace, Robert could not afford to be seen as a harsh ruler, again due to 
the lack of a strong Norman presence;
22
 and as such, it was recorded by William of 
Apulia: that Robert ‘never sought to oppress his people under a cruel tranny’.23 His 
legitimacy was also further helped by his marriage to Sichelgaita, the eldest daughter 
of Prince Guaimar IV of Salerno (1027 – 52) in 1058, since after this date – as noted 
again by William of Apulia – ‘the people who formerly served under compulsion now 
gave the obedience due to ancestral right’.24 
 
As suggested, the rule of Robert Guiscard was evidently one that featured many   
internal uprisings – occurrences which were made possible due to the duke’s inability 
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to discipline (for the reasons stated above) many of his troublesome magnates. Indeed, 
these men were, as suggested by F. Marion Crawford (1905), a ‘persistent thorn in the 
great conqueror’s side’.25 However, despite these setbacks, it would seem that Robert 
was never deterred from chasing ‘his desire for territorial expansion’, and it was often 
the case that internal disorder even helped to dictate the flow of conquest.
26
 For 
example, it can be said that the acquisition of Bari (the last Greek city) in 1071 came 
as an aftereffect of the revolt which transpired in Apulia in 1067 – 68; since according 
to Amatus, the uprising, led by the Normans Joscelin, lord of Molfetta and Geoffrey 
of Conversano, was stirred up by the Greeks, who assisted the rebels by sending them 
money (as indicated before) and Varangians from Constantinople.
27
 Thus, the city of 
Bari was targeted afterwards, by the duke, so as to vanquish the Greek menace from 
Apulia. Also it is important to note: that prior to the 1067 – 68 revolt, Robert was in 
fact campaigning in Sicily with Count Roger and so had the revolt not occurred then 
presumably he would have stayed with his younger brother; thus leaving Bari, at least 
for the time being, in the hands of the Byzantines.
28
 Also, it was not just Bari which 
was targeted by Robert as a consequence of rebellion, since it can also be said that the 
duke’s invasion of the Balkans during the 1080s, in which the island of Corfu was 
taken in 1081, along with the port of Durazzo in 1082 – transpired due to the fact that 
the Greeks frequently aided the Norman rebels.
29
 Robert also justified this campaign 
by indicating that it was to help Emperor Micheal VII (his then ally), whose removal 
from power in 1078 was, according to a letter written by Pope Gregory VII, ‘neither 
just nor rational, but… malicious’.30 
 
Robert’s campaign in the Balkans would be one of his last. In July 1085 the great 
duke ‘rendered up his own spirit’, as he died whilst trying to capture the island of 
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 F. M. Crawford, Southern Italy And Sicily (London: MacMillan, 1905), p.209 
26
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Cephalonia.
31
 His death also brought a swift end to the Norman assaults against the 
Greek mainland and an end to the seemingly endless conquest which occurred in Italy 
under Robert’s leadership – as unlike his predecessor, the new duke of Apulia, Roger 
Borsa (1085 – 1111) was by no means a great military commander.32 In fact, the only 
trait that Roger seemed to inherit from his father was an inherent inability to punish 
severely all those who questioned his authority. Indeed, it was noted by Romuald of 
Salerno, that Roger was ‘a lover of peace, merciful to sinners, kind to his own men’ 
and ‘peaceful to foreigners’; it was said that he ‘tried to win the love rather than the 
fear’ of his people.33 This opinion of Roger was also reflected in the text of Geoffrey 
Malaterra, who wrote: ‘the influence of his piety made him a little remiss in the rigour 
of his justice’.34 Unfortunately for Roger these personal characteristics were not 
necessarily the traits which were required by a medieval prince. Instead, it is argued 
by this thesis that sternness and a desire to punish those who rebelled firmly were a 
must in order to uphold a strong rule. Thus, this is one of the reasons why the reign of 
Roger Borsa can be viewed (as it will be below) as weak. 
 
As Apulia was already quite a volatile region, the lack of an authoritative duke meant 
that outbreaks of internal fighting soon became commonplace during the late 1080s 
and 1090s; as rival families chose to utilise this opportunity – much like many 
families did in Normandy during the unstable years of Robert I (1028 – 35) and 
William’s minority (as stated in chapter one) – ‘to gain more (territory) through force 
of arms’.35 In fact, the situation even became so desperate that the Church tried to 
help Roger by proclaiming the Truce of God in 1093, to try and restore internal peace 
– though its effectiveness was probably limited.36 However, it was not just private 
warfare which was detrimental to Roger’s authority, since the most damaging actions 
came from the duke’s half-brother Bohemond; who – ‘led by ambition for the ducal 
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honour’37 – rebelled against him in 1087 by seizing the city of Oria, which remained 
in his possession due to the duke’s inability (as stated before, Roger did not possess 
his father’s military genius) to oust him.38 Also, in order to appease his half-brother’s 
desire for territory, Roger was also forced to sacrifice, in 1088, large amounts of his 
own land to Bohemond; land that included – as indicated by Geoffrey Malaterra – the 
major cities of Taranto, Otranto, Gallipoli and later Bari in 1090, along with the title: 
prince of Taranto.
39
 But even this did not fully settle his unruly half-brother, since 
Malaterra also indicates that he remained a persistence menace until he left Apulia in 
1096 to join the First Crusade.
40
 
 
Bohemond was not the only member of the Hauteville family, however (see appendix 
three for the family-tree), that shrewdly abused Roger’s weakness, as significantly his 
uncle Count Roger took advantage of him by giving him military support to deal with 
internal chaos, but at a high price. The cost was that Roger had to yield, to his uncle, 
control over all the Calabrian castles which were held jointly between the duke (from 
the time of his father Robert Guiscard) and the count, along with all of his possessions 
in Sicily.
41
 As suggested, the rule of Roger Borsa can be seen as incredibly weak due 
to his reluctance to deal with troublesome lords. It was for this reason why during this 
period the authority of the duke of Apulia declined, as it was broken-down; with both 
land and power going to Bohemond (and his newly created semi-independent 
principality of Taranto) and, perhaps, more importantly to the count of Sicily.
42
 
Indeed, it was during these years, the reigns of Roger and his son William (1111 – 27) 
– who was also characterised as weak by the chroniclers (for example, Romuald of 
Salerno wrote: he was held ‘in contempt by’ his barons ‘for his kindness and 
patience’) – that the status and power of Norman Sicily grew (at least in part) at the 
expense of Apulia’s, whose own prestige had been in decline ever since the loss of its 
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greatest duke, Robert Guiscard.
43
 This also explains partly why the later Norman 
crown was Sicilian and not Apulian; as it was Sicily which had become the dominant 
South-Norman territory by 1130. 
 
When compared to the situation in Apulia, it is easy to see why Sicily became so 
dominant; as its rise in power can largely be attributed to two differences. The first is 
to do with how each territory was acquired; as unlike the island of Sicily which was 
captured chiefly by Count Roger (though help was also obtained from Robert) over 
some thirty years between 1061 and 1091,
44
 the conquest of Apulia on the other hand 
began initially, in the 1040s, when many different groups of Norman knights started 
to take large amounts of territory for themselves in a manner which significantly was 
independent of any true central-leadership.
45
 Indeed, even though William ‘Iron Arm’ 
was the first Norman to be elected as the count of Apulia in September 1042, in 
reality, his position was – as indicated by Amatus – still simply one amongst twelve 
Norman territorial chiefs.
46
 Also at this time, the Normans were still technically 
subordinate to the over-lordship of Prince Guaimar.
47
 Although satisfactory at the 
time, it was this territorial arrangement which was the cause of many later revolts; for 
as mentioned before, the spark of discontent often emerged amongst the lords when 
the duke of Apulia (especially in Robert’s case) tried to extend his authority over land 
which he himself had not taken, by demanding military service for it.
48
 Due to the 
differences in conquest, this problem did not arise in Sicily. And lastly, as for the 
second difference: this was to do with how each territory was managed; as one of the 
reasons why Sicily stayed so peaceful throughout the eleventh- and twelfth-century 
was that unlike in Apulia, Count Roger continued to use the Arab custom of keeping 
all major towns and cities within the demesne of central government, since he did not 
hand them out as parts of fiefs to feudal lords; as was often the case on the Italian 
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mainland.
49
 This prevented the build-up of potentially hostile power-blocks; which 
was a common problem in Apulia. 
 
Having established why Norman Italy was so prone to rebellion (compared to Sicily) 
it is easy to see why the later kingship of Roger II was initially met with hatred by 
many of the Apulian lords.
50
 Having enjoyed the fruits of ducal weakness for a 
considerable number of years (during the reigns of Roger Borsa and William), so that, 
as indicated by Alexander of Telese, no longer did lords ‘fear bloody punishment’ for 
typically lawless acts, such as engaging in private warfare – it was for this reason why 
the Apulians were not prepared to recognise the newly acquired rule of King Roger; 
especially as he was willing to enforce it.
51
 In short, they chose instead (after 1131) to 
rebel.
52
 However, this time they were not alone; as by becoming a king, Roger II also 
gained authority over the previously sovereign Norman ‘principally of Capua’;53 
much to the disgust of the Capuain people and its prince, Robert II who, according to 
the twelfth-century historian Falco of Benevento, did ‘not want to be bound by oaths 
of fealty to the king’; and so he too chose to rebel in 1132.54 And lastly, in addition to 
these internal challenges, the kingship of Roger II was also attacked by the armies of 
the German king, Lothair III (1125 – 37) who invaded Apulia in 1137, and by Pope 
Innocent II who despised Roger’s kingship, largely because he acquired his crown by 
supporting the rival pope, Anacletus II.
55
 
 
Despite the enormity of the challenge which faced him, in the end it was Roger and 
not the rebels which would emerge triumphant; an achievement which was due 
largely to the strength of his character; for despite the fact that much of the rebellion 
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lasted for the better part of a decade (1131 – 39), as indicated by the historian Donald 
Matthew, the king never showed any ‘signs of being discouraged or deterred even by 
spectacular defeats (for example, he was beaten on the field at Scafati in July 1132, 
and at Rignano in October 1137, each time by the powerful Capuan noble, Rainulf, 
count of Alife); he was ‘determined to prevail and have his revenge on his enemies’.56 
And revenge he did have; as unlike his predecessors – Roger Borsa and even Robert 
Guiscard, who, as mentioned before, was often rather lenient towards rebels – Roger 
did not hesitate when it came to giving out harsh punishment.
57
 Indeed, as written by 
Orderic Vitalis: he ‘cruelly suppressed’ all rebels ‘with great forces; he spared no man 
but struck down kinsmen and strangers alike and stripped them of their wealth, 
crushed and humbled them’.58 However, it was not just Orderic that considered 
Roger’s treatment of the rebels as harsh, since both the texts of Alexander of Telese 
and Falco of Benevento also give examples of his cruelty. For instance, it was 
recorded by Telese that in 1132 Roger’s army ‘furiously’ sacked the rebel city of 
Montepeloso, by ‘putting anybody they met to the sword’.59 He also stated that one of 
the leaders, Roger of Plenco was ‘put to death’, whilst another, Tancred of 
Conversano was ‘sent to Sicily in chains’.60 Similarly, it was also documented by 
Falco, that after a revolt at Bari, in 1139, Roger chose to hand out particularly brutal 
punishments, since ‘he secured the judicial murder of Jaquintus (the city’s ruler), his 
counsellors and ten others.’61 In short, by punishing those who rebelled severely, 
Roger was able to strengthen royal authority throughout the kingdom and achieve a 
lasting peace (as there were no revolts against the king after 1139); a peace which his 
mainland predecessors had failed to achieve. 
 
After the final defeat of the rebels in 1139, Roger chose to turn his attention, since he 
was now free to do so, to more productive endeavours which aimed at improving the 
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power and prestige of the Norman Kingdom. In addition to continuing building work 
on Sicily’s many famous cathedrals, in 1140 he also introduced a series of new laws, 
known as the royal assizes.
62
 These touched upon all possible aspects of 
contemporary legal concern, such as civil law, private property, public property, the 
Church, royal finances and military service.
63
 The assizes helped to centralise and 
strengthen royal authority, as significantly they established laws which would be 
applicable in every region.
64
 However, it was not just administrative reform and 
construction which Roger focused on after 1139, since he also desired to enlarge his 
territory; and so he did, in a number of different ways. Firstly, he began by expanding 
his northern Italian frontier in March 1140, as he sent an army (note: that his soldiers 
had been toughened over the last decade of warfare, much like the Conqueror’s had 
during the violent 1040s and 1050s, as stated in chapter one), led by his sons Roger 
and Alfonso, to capture the imperial owned region, known as the Abruzzo; which they 
did.
65
 After this, he targeted North Africa (1146 – 48), firstly to protect his trade 
routes from the Arab pirates (who constantly attacked them) and secondly to 
conqueror territory; that in the end – as recorded by the Muslim chronicler Ibn al-
Athir – ‘extended from Tripoli to the borders of Tunis, and from the western Maghrib 
to Qayrawan’.66 In addition to the above, for a brief period (1147 – 49) Roger also 
held the island of Corfu, which he acquired along with a number of Greek silk 
weavers (who were taken to Palermo, to form the basis for the Sicilian silk industry), 
when the royal admiral, George of Antioch raided Greece under the veil of the Second 
Crusade (1145 – 48).67 
 
To conclude: having explored the reigns of many different rulers in Norman Southern 
Italy and Sicily, it is easy to see the downsides, for a prince, of not punishing rebels 
severely; as despite the fact that Robert Guiscard was one of the greatest conquerors 
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of the eleventh-century, his authority in Apulia was regularly challenged, throughout 
his reign, largely, because of his willingness to show leniency (although as indicated 
above, he did have reasons for not treating the rebels harshly and also rebellion did 
help to dictate the direction of his conquests) to those who defied him. The same can 
be said about his son and successor, Roger Borsa, whose rule in Apulia was extremely 
weak due to his inability to show a firm hand. This also meant that his half-brother, 
Bohemond and uncle, Count Roger were free to take advantage of his weakness, with 
the result that ducal authority was in a constant state of decline until Apulia was 
absorbed into the dominion of Roger II. And finally, with the downsides in mind, it is 
also easy to see the benefits, since it was by punishing those who rebelled severely 
that enabled King Roger to achieve a lasting peace (for the rest of his reign) after 
1139; a peace which gave him the freedom to develop his newly formed kingdom and 
to conqueror territory. 
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Conclusion
 
 
 
 
Having discussed the reigns of many different eleventh- and twelfth-century Norman 
rulers, situated both in Northern Europe and in the Mediterranean, it is clear that the 
central premise of this thesis (as outlined in the introduction) stands. As identified 
throughout the course of chapters one, two and three the successfulness of a medieval 
prince (either a king or a duke/count) is clearly linked to how they dealt with rebellion 
at the start of their reign; as it was often the case that when a prince defeated and then 
punished those who had rebelled sternly (even if, the use of harsh punishment was at 
times condemned by the sources for going too far) that afterwards their authority was 
much stronger, for the simple reason that a lasting precedent had been established 
early on – that insolence to their rule would not be tolerated.1 This also acted as a 
catalyst for later wealth (as each prince became very rich), internal development and 
conquest; a point which was indicated in each chapter, by several examples of princes 
whose reigns fit within this premise. 
 
These were: Duke William II since after he had crushed all of the rebellious elements 
at the start of his reign, he then went on to extend and increase ducal power 
throughout Normandy and perhaps more significantly he also went on to conquer 
England in 1066 (indicated in chapter one). Additionally, once he had become king, 
although his rule suffered terribly at the beginning, by punishing those who chose to 
rebel quite sternly (as indicated in chapter two), his reign after 1070 was incredibly 
prosperous, since he used his newly acquired authority – the power that he had gained 
by crushing the rebels – to boost his wealth and to transform, modernise and feudalise 
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English society. Furthermore, in addition to William’s the same can also be said about 
the reigns of William Rufus, Henry I (in England) and Roger II (in Southern Italy and 
Sicily), since each king had to deal with and crush, many rebellious elements during 
the early part of their reign (as stated in chapters two and three), before internal peace, 
prosperity and conquest were achieved.
2
 
 
Having established many of the benefits which early rebellion can bring when dealt 
with correctly, it is necessary to sum up the negatives; since it was often the case that 
when a prince failed to vanquish all rebellious elements early that internal disorder 
tended to flourished throughout the majority of their reign, for the simple reason that 
the authority of the prince was never truly established; and as such, the lords were free 
to challenge (without fear of reprisal) the prince’s rule – which they did – whenever 
they pleased. Also, without the rule of law – since it was also the responsibility of the 
prince to prevent outbreaks of private warfare (a task which was hard to do when their 
authority was weak) – life within that particular state (either a kingdom or a duchy) 
tended to break down, since greedy lords took advantage of the prince’s weakness by 
attacking their rivals; which in turn, resulted in the destruction of villages, farmland 
and churches; as well as having a negative effect on the prince’s wealth, as weak 
rulers also tended to be rather poor.
3
 Examples of those who fit within this part of the 
premise were: Robert I (as indicated in chapter one), Robert Curthose, who also lost 
Normandy because of his weakness in 1106 (as indicated in chapter two) and Roger 
Borsa (as indicated in chapter three); all of whom were, as suggested by the sources, 
incredibly weak rulers. 
 
In a sense the same can also be said about the reign of Robert Guiscard, since 
although powerful (as he was more than capable of defeating in battle any lord who 
challenged his authority), his rule does display, yet again, the necessity for a prince to 
hand out just, and sometimes severe, punishment to those who chose to rebel; as when 
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he did not (for example, Robert was very lenient towards rebels), the fact that he was 
considered to be great in other respects, made no difference, since the authority of the 
prince was never truly established.
4
 Leniency was not the key to a lasting peace. 
 
And finally, in terms of what happened when no major uprising occurred during the 
reign of a Norman prince, it would seem, as indicated by the reign of Richard II, that 
no major conquest occurred either. Indeed, despite the fact that Richard II (indicated 
in chapter one) was a wealthy ruler (internal peace was necessary for a prince to 
acquire great wealth), militarily he was weak. This was because early rebellion also 
provided the perfect training ground for both the prince and his soldiers to sharpen 
their military skills; skills which were necessary to facilitate conquest. 
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Appendix One – the rulers of Normandy and their family links.1 
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Appendix Two – the great house of Bellême-Montgomery.2 
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Appendix Three – the family of Hauteville.3 
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